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Abstract 
 
The planning of promotions and other marketing events frequently requires 
manufacturers to make decisions about the optimal duration of these activities. Yet 
manufacturers often lack the support tools for decision making. We assume that 
customer decisions at the aggregated level follow a state-dependent Markov process. On 
the basis of the expected economic return associated with dynamic response to stimuli, 
we determine the ideal length of marketing events using dynamic programming 
optimization and apply the model to a complex promotion event. Results suggest that 
this methodology could help managers in the publishing industry to plan the optimal 
duration of promotion events.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Short-term promotions can suffer from many hidden pitfalls if they are not well planned and 
controlled (see Strang, 1976). The planning of promotion events should be based on objective 
procedures such as the maximization of profits or other marketing objectives linked to a 
particular promotion. The critical decisions of manufacturers are often concerned with the 
time dimension of promotion events: that is, their frequency (number of events in the 
planning horizon), timing (dates for each event), and duration (the length of time an event 
should last). Yet the literature on manufacturers’ promotions focuses on timing and frequency 
rather than duration. This situation exists partly because the duration of promotion events is 
usually predetermined by the trade, particularly in the case of price discounts (with or without 
feature and display), the duration of which is fixed by retailers at one week. This focus on 
frequency and timing is reflected in various approaches to promotion planning, from the 
perspective of both retailers and manufacturers (Little 1975, Neslin and Shoemaker 1983, 
Cooper et al., 1999). Within this framework researchers have examined the number of times a 
brand or category should be promoted, the interval between consecutive promotions, and the 
regularity or homogeneity of inter-promotion times. For price promotions, in fact, the 
duration of the promotion event has been analyzed only in the context of coupons, the finding 
being that short-term promotions accelerate purchases, whereas long-term promotions seem 
not to affect purchase acceleration (Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan, 2003).  
 
In the case of manufacturers’ non-price promotions, however, the time dimension is more 
customized and the duration of a particular promotion is more of a decision factor for the 
manufacturer. This is the case of value-packaging, in-pack premiums, manufacturing 
couponing, and other promotion events decided by manufacturers. In particular, 
manufacturers are less restricted by trade when planning the length of value-pack promotions 
than when planning the length of price promotions. Unfortunately, despite the large number 
of academic studies on promotions (e.g. Blattberg and Neslim, 1990; Chandon, 1995), non-
price promotions have received limited attention by marketing researchers. And, when price 
promotions are either impossible to implement or inadequate, existing research provides little 
guidance to decision makers (Lichtenstein et al., 1997).  
Two conditions are present in a wide variety of marketing activities, particularly in the area of 
promotions; most of the promotion events show a steady effectiveness decay of economic 
returns, as represented in Figure 1 (Blattberg and Neslin 1990, p. 361) and have direct costs 
associated with the duration of the event.  
 
Deal response 
 Time 
Figure 1: Decay of deal response to the marketing stimuli 
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Since the 1990s, hazard models have been the tool most frequently used for solving duration 
problems in marketing (see Helsen and Schmittlein, 1993, for a review of duration time 
problems). In marketing research, these models are used to study inter-purchase times in 
various contexts (Gupta, 1991; Vilcassim and Jain, 1991; Wedel et al., 1995) and the timing 
of the adoption of an innovation (see e.g. Sinha and Chandrashekaran, 1992). But in hazard 
models, the market responses to a stimulus – for example, customer arrivals – occur randomly 
and follow a point process (usually, a Poisson process). This model specification implicit in 
hazard models are not appropriate for tackling problems in which customer arrival times are 
not observed or inter-purchase times are irrelevant (e.g. in periodical magazines, what matters 
is the total sales of each issue rather than when they are purchased). 
 
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap by providing a model that, from the perspective 
of economic returns, should help to plan the optimal duration of promotion events and other 
marketing actions which could be implemented when two circumstances occur: a) the 
marketing stimuli have a steady declining effect, and b) there are direct costs to maintaining 
the stimuli. In order to illustrate the potential of the model, we consider serial promotions in 
the publishing industry, a complex promotional type that will illustrate the model’s capability 
of tackling the duration decision issue in a wide variety of marketing decisions and 
environments. This empirical setting presents two points of view that make the application of 
the methodology attractive: 1) It is a type of promotion that has not been studied before but 
which has shown to be effective in diminishing the decline rate of periodical sales, and 2) it is 
a complex promotion that, we demonstrate, cannot be modeled with the methodological 
approaches currently used in marketing.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present the general methodology in order to 
provide a broad view of its potential applicability to marketing decisions. Second, we 
consider a complex type of promotion event and apply the model with two aims: to show that 
the flexibility of this modeling approach allows for adaptations to complex situations, and to 
overcome the limitations of the existing methodology in marketing – primarily hazard models 
assuming Poisson distributions – when facing some of the contingencies of promotion events 
that affect the decision of duration. Finally, we discuss the results and provide the conclusions 
and extensions of the research. 
 
2 The methodological background 
 
The study of optimal duration has attracted considerable attention in many scientific 
disciplines. From the perspective of dynamic optimization, the analysis of the optimal length 
of time spent in a particular event is called Optimal Stopping Time problem – a type of 
optimization problem for a random process involving only two possible actions: to stop or to 
continue. The literature in this area is extensive (see e.g. Bertsekas, 1987; Shiryayev, 1978). 
These techniques have been applied to several disciplines, including probability and statistics 
(e.g. Freeman, 1983) and economics and finance (e.g. Myneni, 1992), among others. 
Although these techniques have enormous potential for application in the marketing context, 
they have yet to be applied to assist managers in those decisions in which the duration of a 
marketing activity is involved.  
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Let’s consider a marketing dynamic activity, defined by certain set S={ }1,..., ds s  of possible 
states. Let X be a Markov random process1, which summarizes the successive states achieved 
by the process on the states space S. The Markov process is defined over the times 
{0,1,2,...,T} and denoted by X={ } 0Tk kX = , where T can take a finite or an infinite value. 
Marketing decision makers can apply certain stimuli to modify the probability law of process 
X. When the stimulus is applied, the evolution of process X is ruled by a matrix B of transition 
probability distributions and managers can decide to stop the stimulus at any time based on 
the experience up to that time. At period k, the control variable can be “applying stimulus” or 
“not applying stimulus”. In case of not applying stimulus at time k, the reward in the state Xk 
is ( )kf X . Using Bellman’s maximum principle, when the stimulus is applied, V(k,Xk) is the 
optimal reward at time k and the optimal strategy at time k satisfies 
[ ]{ }max .( ),k k B kV(k, X ) f X E V(k +1,X ) =  As a consequence, an optimal rule is “not 
applying stimulus” if the reward ( )kf X  is greater than the expected optimal reward 
[ ]B kE V(k +1, X )  and “applying stimulus”, otherwise. Therefore, the optimal duration of the 
stimulus is { }* min : ( ) .k kk k V(k, X ) f X= =  
 
Sometimes the optimal stopping rule can be implemented at any time; e.g., discount 
promotions. However, in many marketing activities duration must be planned in advance and 
*k  is an indicative duration choice for future marketing activities; e.g., coupons which are a 
series of attached tickets often to be collected periodically and needed to obtain a discount or 
gift on merchandise. Pre-promotion planning involves setting some promotional-test, 
gathering information about market responses, building a decision model and determining the 
optimal length of future marketing activities. The stability of the optimal duration can be 
followed up on the basis of future responses. 
 
Intuitively, many marketing activities appear to be suitable settings for exploring the potential 
of these models. In general, the model is an appropriate optimization tool when the following 
conditions are presented: a) a steady declining effect of the marketing stimuli and b) direct 
costs to maintaining the stimuli. 
 
One effective way to capture the steady declining effect of marketing stimuli is to consider 
that the consumers’ response { }kX  follows a state-dependent Markovian process. Markovian 
models have been previously adopted for modeling purchasing behavior (Telser 1963, and 
Zufryden 1986) and other marketing problems2. We say that the consumers’ response { }kX  
follows a Markov process if { }{ } { }1 10Pr Prkk j k kjX X X X+ += =  for each time k>0. Let 
( )0Prb X= , with 0ib ≥  and 1 1d ii b= =∑ , denote the probability distribution of being in each 
state i at time 0 and let B define the transition probability matrix containing the probabilities 
{ }1Pr k kX X+ . Then, the probability distribution of kX  is given by { }Pr ' kkX b B= . The 
Markov process is stationary if the probability distribution of kX  remains unaltered with the 
                                                 
1
 Markov processes are described in many books on probability (see e.g. Ross, 1996). Statistical inference for 
discrete time Markov processes was considered by Billingsley (1961) and Telser (1963). 
2
 For a review of this topic, see e.g. Leeflang et al. (2000). 
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passage of time; i.e. { } { }1Pr Prk kX X +=  for any time k. This only happens if ' 'b b B=  or 
equivalently ( )' 0I B b− = ; i.e. b is an eigenvector (normalized to sum one) associated with a 
unit eigenvalue3.  
 
Assume that the consumers’ response { }kX  to some marketing stimuli and the reward 
( )kf X  at time k is a random variable which possible outcomes are ( ) ( )( )1 ,..., 'df f s f s= . 
Some of these outcomes may be negative (the application of the stimulus is not profitable), 
and others positive. As the promotion outcome is ruled by a markovian process, the expected 
profit is given by  
 
( ) ( ) 0 ' kk kE f X E E f X X b B f =   =      , 
 
evolving according to ' kb B . Note that when b is a stationary distribution, the expected profit 
( )kE f X    is constant for any time k. If it is a positive constant, the optimal duration will be 
infinite, i.e. the stimulus becomes an additional service or characteristic of the product. If it is 
a negative value, the stimulus should never be applied. But for most of the real world 
situations, the market responses to marketing stimuli are not stationary. Typically the process 
starts with ( )0 ' 0E f X b f= >    and then it exhibits an exponential trend given by 
( ) ' kkE f X b B f=   . In the long term the expected profit ' kb B f  converge to a limit 
performance value, that we will call A: if A>0, the performance of the marketing stimulus is 
always profitable and its duration should be infinite, but if A<0, there is a time k* when the 
stimulus is not longer profitable and should be stopped. Being the latter the most frequent 
type of market response, we will use this markovian process in the model presented in the 
next section. 
 
2.1. The model 
 
Let’s consider a representative potential consumer who may be in one of two states: prior 
purchase intention, event denoted by 1x ; or no prior purchase intention, denoted by 2x . At the 
same time, manufacturers should analyze the expected performance of the promotion event. 
This marketing activity cannot be stopped once it has been launched. However, in the 
planning process, manufacturers consider the dilemma: “Would it better to have designed the 
promotion in k-1 periods? (which, in dynamic programming terms, is called to stop 
promoting)” or “Would it better to have designed the promotion in k or more periods? (called 
to continue promoting)”. This analysis will help manufacturers to plan the duration of future 
promotion events to achieve the best expected return. If promotion continues, the potential 
customer decides, based on prior purchase intentions, whether to buy the product, denoted by 
state 1z ; or not to buy the product, denoted by 2z . Manufacturers aim to enhance the 
purchase intention X of customers, but they only observe the purchase decision outcome Z. 
 
Assuming that the prior purchase intention depends only on the previous intention and not on 
the consumer’s entire purchasing history, we model the decisions process as a Markov chain, 
the motion of which is governed by the transition probabilities { }kmk XX +Pr , constant for all 
                                                 
3
 As B has non negative elements and its rows sum one, B has at least a unit eigenvalue. 
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period k. The transition probabilities describe the probability distribution from one decision to 
another. Let B denote the transition matrix defined as follows: 
 
{ } { }
{ } { } ( )
1 1 2 1
1 1
1 2 2 2
1 1
Pr Pr 1 0
1Pr Pr
k k k k
k k k k
X x X x X x X x
B
X x X x X x X x θ θ
− −
− −
 = = = =   
= =   
− = = = =  
 
. 
 
This means that there  is a proportion ( )1,0∈θ  of customers who intended not to buy at the 
previous period, but who now intend to buy the product.  
 
When a promotion occurs, the probability distribution of purchase decisions depends 
conditionally on the prior purchase intention at each period k, as 
 { } 1Pr 11 === xXzZ kk ,    { }2 1Pr 0k kZ z X x= = = , 
{ } γ=== 21Pr xXzZ kk ,    { }2 2Pr 1k kZ z X x γ= = = − . 
 
Therefore, there is a proportion ( )1,0∈γ  of potential customers who change their minds and 
decide to buy the promoted product.  
 
Computing the optimal promotional duration requires the study of { }kkk ZxX 1Pr ==pi , the 
probability distribution of prior buying intention ( 1kX x= ) conditional on the history of 
buying behavior ( )0 ,..., 'k kZ Z Z= . Publishers do not usually observe all data X, except for the 
final decision (potential customers either do or do not buy the product). Applying Bayes’ rule, 
we can derive the analytical expression  
 
{ } { } { }{ }
1 1
1 1 11
1 1 1
1
Pr Pr ,
Pr .
Pr
k k k k k
k k k
k k
X x Z Z Z X x
X x Z
Z Z
pi
+ + +
+ + +
+
= =
= = =
 


 
 
From the probability properties of the buying decision process, we can prove that 
( )1 1,k k kZpi pi+ += Φ , with 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where ( )I Z a=  is one when Z a= , and zero when Z a≠ . This expression can be used to 
compute iteratively, using the observed data kZ

 and the estimations of parameters θ  and γ . 
Note that 1kpi +  is larger than kpi  for 
1
1kZ z+ = , and vanishes to zero when 
2
1kZ z+ = .  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
1
1
,
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
1 1 1 1
k k
k k k
k k k
k
k
k
Z I Z z
I Z z
pi pi θ
pi
pi pi θ pi θ γ
pi θ
pi θ γ
+ +
+
+ −
Φ = ⋅ =
+ − + − −
− − −
= ⋅ =
− − − −
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Next we focus on the computation of the optimal duration for promotions. Denote by 
' ' 0P C> > , the price (P) and cost (C) of the product with promotion; and 0P C> > , the 
price and cost without promotion. We assume that manufacturers aim to maximize the 
expected economic value of prior purchase intentions. If the promotion has continued to the 
end of period k+1, the associated expected return associated with the sales-promotion process 
is given by the value function ( )1 1K KV pi+ + . At the end of period k, each manufacturer 
computes its probability distribution of prior purchase intention kpi  and decides whether, in 
dynamic programming terms, to stop promotion (with the associated expected profit, 
( ) ( )( )1k kP C Cpi pi− + − − ), or to continue promotion (with the associated expected profit, 
( )1 1K KE V pi+ +   ). Whenever the expected profit of terminating promotion is greater than the 
expected profit under promotion; i.e. if  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 ,
kk k Z k k k
P C C E V Zpi pi pi
+ + +
 
− + − − > Φ  , 
 
the manufacturer should have designed a promotion of k periods length. Then, solving the 
equality ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 ,
kk k Z k k k
P C C E V Zα α α
+ + +
 
− + − − = Φ  , there is an ( )0,1kα ∈ , such 
that whenever k kpi α< , promotion should have been stopped (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
    kα  
                                                stop                            continue 
    Figure 2: The decision threshold at k-th period 
 
 
The computation of all the thresholds { }kα  is involved (see Appendix for details), so that we 
consider a simple-to-apply approximation to the solution. Note that ( ) ( )1k kV Vpi pi+≤  for all k 
and all ( )0,1pi ∈  and ( )kV pi  is piecewise linear, concave, and increasing in pi . Henceforth, 
1 1k k kα α α− +≤ ≤  for all k. Publishers should stop production of promoted magazines with 
negative expected returns, so that ( ) ( )( )1 0k kP C Cα α− + − − ≥ , and therefore /k C Pα ≥ , 
kpi
( )( )
1 1 1
,
kZ k k k
E V Zpi
+ + +
 Φ   
( ) ( ) ( )1k kP C Cpi pi− + − −
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are valid for all k. Because 1 2 ... ...k
C
P
α α α α= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ , an optimal stopping rule for 
promotion is given as follows, 
{ }{ }* min : ,1,2,3,.... k Ck k Ppi α α= ∈ < = , 
 
where [ ]1,0∈α  since 0<C<P. In other words, the optimal duration of the promotion event is 
*k  periods, and manufacturers should therefore plan promotions to be no longer than *k  
periods based on their expected economic value of purchase intentions.  
 
The decision rule reported here is based on a two-state model. Generalization to multi-state 
models is clearly desirable to deal with a number of interesting marketing decision situations. 
Yet in serial promotions this parsimonious modeling is consistent with our problem as 
illustrated in the next section. 
 
3. The application and results  
 
In the publishing industry, where most products are marketed with a fixed resale price, non-
price promotions predominate. This is the case for periodical magazines; a common practice 
in some European countries is to assemble a value pack containing the magazine plus another 
product to sell at a price above the price of the magazine but below the sum of the expected 
prices of the two products. One option for publishers is to serialize the promotion by 
fractioning the additional product in the value pack across different issues of the magazine: a 
dictionary fractionated in a collection of CDs, for example. We call this type of marketing 
activity a serial promotion. The marketing objectives of serial promotions are to acquire new 
customers for the magazine and to increase purchasing frequency among existing customers.  
 
The acquisition of new customers is the basic objective of these promotions, as those who are 
satisfied with the promoted product have an increased probability of making repeat purchases 
(see Rothschild and Gaidis, 1981). In fact, new customers may switch from other magazines 
(secondary demand) during the life of the promotion if they find it to be attractive enough. 
Alternatively, new customers may not be regular buyers of this type of magazine, but may 
enter the market (primary demand) when they see an appealing promotion. Hence, it is 
expected that most of these customers will soon stop participating in the promotion if the 
value pack does not fulfill their expectations4.  
 
Regular buyers may skip some issues, either because they decide not to buy any publication 
on that occasion or because they switch to another publication. Thus an increase in the 
purchase loyalty of actual customers is another objective pursued through the use of serial 
promotions, which reinforce customer loyalty by introducing incentives to decrease skipping 
behavior and by raising barriers against switching. Customers who purchase a value pack with 
a low-involvement attitude may stop buying if they do not find the added product to be 
worthy of the premium price. So, during the serial promotion, a large percentage of this type 
of customer is expected to abandon the purchase of the value pack in the early stages; either 
they turn to the regular issue or they return to their previous switching behavior. 
 
                                                 
4
 The long-term effectiveness of the promotion event in the acquisition of new customers is rarely large. In one 
study, publishers of several newspapers estimated that these types of promotions generate an increase of about 
1% of customers (Santana López, 2002). 
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What publishers actually pursue is the market response portrayed in Figure 1: a positive 
immediate response to the deal, followed by effectiveness decay. The previous presentation of 
the objectives of the promotion gives some hints to understanding the shape of the effect 
decay of the promotion over time. But the basic explanation to this convex shape is that most 
entries will take place during the first week; thereafter, the decision of any customer to 
purchase a value pack at a premium price instead of the regular issue depends on whether or 
not the customer purchases the previous issue. To enter the promotion after the first week or 
to re-enter the promotion after skipping one or more issues would mean that the customer, 
who is paying a premium price, would fail to complete the collection. So, although some 
customers may demonstrate this behavior, their impact on the total sales of every issue would 
always be exceeded by the number of defections. Defections occur because customers try the 
promotion and decide that it is not worth the premium price, or because they skip issues for 
reasons external to the promotion (e.g. boredom, inconvenience). These defections occur 
primarily during the first weeks of the promotion, and the defection rate decreases over time 
as the commitment of the remaining customers increases. (Discontent with the fifth issue in a 
collection of six issues would not stop most of the remaining customers from buying the last 
issue). Expecting such a deal response, the relevant question for publishers is: Following a 
profit maximization criterion, into how many issues should the added value of the promotion 
be fractionated? 
 
The optimal stopping time rule previously described is an appropriate tool for determining the 
ideal length of serial promotions in periodical magazines as their inter-purchase times are 
fixed, not allowing consumers to purchase at any time during the length of the promotion 
event, and difficult to be registered, and there are remarkable state-dependence effects on 
consumers’ purchase intentions and final purchase decisions. 
 
We apply the optimal stopping time rule to two specialized magazines, Magazine A and 
Magazine B, which are published by a multinational publishing company and distributed 
monthly at different prices, with and without promotion. For Magazine A, which is the leader 
in the category of Science and Nature magazines, we consider a data sequence that begins 
November, 1999 and ends September, 2003. For Magazine B, which has the second highest 
market share in the Business category, data begin April, 2001 and end September, 2003. In 
particular, we are using their sales data as a measure of consumer responses to promotion in 
each magazine. Due to the confidentiality policies of the publishing company, sales data were 
provided as a percentage of the market potential, hereafter called potential market share. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the values of the potential market share for Magazines A and B, 
respectively, in which vertical lines denote the end of promotion (promotions are 
consecutively implemented within the sample period and the exponential decay of their effect 
is clearly observed in all of them). The duration time of serial promotions planned by the 
publishing industry is 6 or 7 weeks, what is considered a good rule of thumb based on its 
experience.  
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Figure 3: Sales potential quota of the                   Figure 4: Sales potential quota of the  
                promoted Magazine A                                             promoted Magazine B              
 
Next, following the profit maximization criterion inhered in our model we determine the 
optimal duration length of serial promotion for Magazines A and B.  
 
Two steps are involved in the task of developing an adequate estimation approach of the 
parameters θ  and γ . First, we define the decision variables that describe the consumer 
behavior. Given a threshold at each period k, we set the prior purchase intention to buy 
1xX k = , if the sales potential quota of the non-promoted magazine is larger than the 
threshold; and 2xX k = , otherwise. Analogously, we define the variable kZ  using the sales 
potential quota of the promoted magazine. The second step consists of estimating the 
parameters θ  and γ  as follows, 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 2 1 2
12 2
2 2
12 2
ˆ
ˆ,
K K
k k k kk k
K K
k kk k
I X x I X x I Z x I X x
I X x I X x
θ γ−= =
−
= =
= = = =
= =
= =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
. 
 
For this problem, we set the threshold at 0.5, which is the central value of the sales potential 
quota in both magazines. For Magazine A, the estimation of parameters θ  and γ  is 
ˆ 0.5833Aθ =  and ˆ 0.4167Aγ = , respectively; for Magazine B, we obtain ˆ 0.5385 Bθ =  and 
ˆ 0.2308Bγ = , respectively. 
 
The aim of launching a promotion is to predispose potential customers to buy a product. 
However, its effect on sales does not last forever. The length of the promotion should be 
efficiently chosen according to the sales-promotion process. Accounting for consumer 
responses to promotion, θˆ  and γˆ , manufacturers should plan the length of promotion that 
maximizes their expected return over the planning horizon. Next, we compute the 
probabilities { }kpi  and the parameter α  associated with each magazine in order to determine 
the optimal promotional duration *k  for Magazines A and B. 
 
Figure 5 shows the values of { }kpi  and α  for Magazine A, which reveals that the optimal 
duration for promoting Magazine A is * 6k = , as kpi <α , for k=6, 7, 8... To analyze this 
result, we consider the actual average length of promotion, which is 6 (see Figure 3, in which 
vertical lines denote the end of promotion). These data allow us to conclude that, in the case 
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of Magazine A, the duration of serial promotions planned by the publishing company is the 
optimal length.  
 
In the case of Magazine B, the optimal duration of serial promotions computed by the model 
is * 4k =  (see Figure 6). Currently, the duration time planned by the publisher is 6 weeks (see 
Figure 4, denoting the end of promotion with a vertical line), 2 weeks longer than the length 
suggested by the model.  
 
                                   
Figure 5: Sequence kpi  and line α  for                      Figure 6: Sequence kpi  and line α  for             
                promoted Magazine A                                                  promoted Magazine B 
 
The application of our model to the publishers’ decisions suggests that the serial promotion of 
Magazine B should be lengthened by two weeks and that Magazine A’s promotion should be 
maintained at the current six weeks’ duration. 
 
As Figures 3 and 4 show, serial promotion can be sequentially implemented with a fixed 
length k. Next we show that this methodology also is an effective tool for dynamic decision 
making in the long term. Assume that promotions are sequentially implemented. The return of 
the first promotion is given by ( )1,k kR f X=  and the return rate of the n-th promotion is 
( ) ( )( ), 1 kn k nk nXR f X f −= , that we assume, stationary and ergodic with 1,ln kRE   < ∞  . 
Thus, the return after n promotions is ( ) ( ), , 1,1nk n k k knf X R R R−= …  and taking logarithms, we 
have: 
( ) 1 . . 1,,
1
1 lnln ln
n
a sn
knk i k k
i
Rf X R M E
n
=
= → =   ∑ , 
 
by the ergodic theorem. Therefore, the return after n promotions growths exponentially as 
( ) knMnkf X e≈  (in the long term planning, a discount factor r ne− should multiply the previous 
expression). In summary, the long term performance of successive promotions is determined 
by the return rate of a single promotion Mk, suggesting that the optimal k* is an optimal rule 
for all successive promotions. 
 
4. Conclusions and managerial implications 
 
Despite advances in modeling promotion events, much can be done to enlarge the catalogue 
of techniques for determining the optimal promotion duration. Further development in this 
direction has practical relevance for marketing managers. Most of the research has overlooked 
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the issue of duration and has focused, rather, on timing (when?) and frequency (how many?), 
so that models available to assist the short-term planning of promotion events have still not 
covered the other basic time dimension: duration. 
 
As we have discussed, promotional models available in the marketing literature are of limited 
use in the context of those promotion events or other marketing initiatives in which customer 
arrivals, sales, or other phenomena do not occur as a random series of events, but rather in 
fixed periodical points of time.  
 
We propose a model for fixed timing customer entries. These problems may be found when 
trying to model the market response of any promotion in which the marketing effect (e.g. 
sales, arrivals, attendance) is distributed in a time-discrete fashion. Examples can be found in 
the publishing and entertainment industries (such as periodical publications, TV and 
broadcasting series, entertainment, and sports events) and in other industries such as 
transportation (scheduled flights). The analysis also incorporates the state-dependence of 
purchase decisions by modeling periodical decisions of customers through a Markovian 
process. Using dynamic programming optimization, we tackle the question of the optimal 
duration of magazine promotions, taking into account the economic value of purchase 
intentions.  
 
We show that this methodology is an effective and useful tool for dynamic decision making in 
the short and long term planning of promotion events. We apply the method to two 
magazines, and our analysis suggests that this approach can determine the optimal duration of 
promotion events in both and that promotion length should be modified in one of them.  
 
One potential limitation of our approach is the requirement of sales data with and without 
promotion to infer purchase intentions and actual purchase decision. However, when non-
promoted sales are unavailable, this methodology can still be applied by means of a scenario-
case analysis for different conjectured parameters θ  and γ , using the observed purchases as 
input.  
 
We believe that the model and methodology employed in this paper are broadly applicable to 
other types of promotions and to other industry sectors that require decisions to be made 
about the optimal duration of marketing activities. In particular, our approach can be applied 
to a wide range of marketing decision situations that are characterized by a steady decay 
response to marketing stimuli, including situations involving advertising effectiveness, 
broadcast audiences, and such exhibition attendance as movies. 
 
Appendix: Stopping Time Rule 
 
Assume a planning horizon of N periods. If the promotion has continued to the end of the Nth 
period, the expected return associated with the sales-promotion process is  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' 1 'N N N NV P C Cpi pi pi= − + − − . 
 
At the end of period N-1, each manufacturer computes its probability distribution of prior 
purchase intention 1Npi −  and decides whether to stop promotion (with the associated expected 
profit, ( ) ( )( )1 11N NP C Cpi pi− −− + − − ) or to continue promotion (with the associated expected 
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profit, ( )
NZ N N
E V pi   ). As a consequence, the optimal decision will be one that maximizes 
the expected return, i.e., 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
max 1 ,
max 1 , , .
N
N
N N N N Z N N
N N Z N N N
V P C C E V
P C C E V Z
pi pi pi pi
pi pi pi
− − − −
− − −
= − + − −   
 = − + − − Φ 
 
 
This rule can be extrapolated to all stage k, substituting N for k+1, so that  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }1 1 1max 1 , ,kK K k k Z k k kV P C C E V Zpi pi pi pi+ + + = − + − − Φ  , 
 
In order to compute ( )( )
1 1 1
,
kZ k k kE V Zpi+ + + Φ  , we consider 
( )( ) { } ( )( )( ) ( )( )
{ }( ) ( )
1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1
,
1 1 1 1
1 0 ,
k k
k
k
Z k k k k k Z K
k
k k Z K
E V Z Pr Z z E V
Pr Z z E V
pi θ
pi pi
pi θ γ
pi
+ +
+
+ + + +
+ +
  − − −
 Φ = =      
− − − −   
+ − =   
 
 
and since { } ( ) ( )( )11 1 1 1 1k k kPr Z z pi θ γ pi+ = = − − − − , then 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1
, 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 ,
k
k
Z k k k k K
k
k K
E V Z V
V
pi θ
pi θ γ pi
θ γ pi
θ γ pi
+ + + +
+
 
− − −
 Φ = − − − −     
− − − − 
+ − − −
 
 
particularly, for the last period, ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, 1 1 1 ' 'NZ N N N NE V Z P Cpi θ pi− − Φ = − − − −  , so 
that, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }1 1 1 1 1max 1 , 1 1 1 ' 'N N N N NV P C C P Cpi pi pi θ pi− − − − −= − + − − − − − − . For 
previous periods, this expectation could be iteratively computed backwards. 
 
Consider the decision problem at time k, and the value function ( )K KV pi . Whenever the 
expected profit of terminating promotion is greater than the expected profit under promotion; 
i.e. if ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 ,
kk k Z k k kP C C E V Zpi pi pi+ + + − + − − > Φ  , the manufacturer should stop the 
promotion. Then, solving the equality ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 ,
kk k Z k k kP C C E V Zα α α+ + + − + − − = Φ  , 
there is an ( )0,1kα ∈ , such that whenever k kpi α< , promotion should be stopped.  
For example at time N-1, assuming ( )' 'P C C θ> − , promotion should be stopped if 
1 1N Npi α− −< , where 1Nα −  solves ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 11 1 1 1 ' 'N N NP C C P Cα α θ α− − −− + − − = − − − − , 
i.e., ( ) ( )1 ' ' 1 'N C C P P Pα θ θ− = − + − − . The computation of all the thresholds { }kα  is 
involved, so that we consider a simple approximation to the solution, described in Section 3. 
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